Highlights
From 2010 to 2023, 844 CMS enforcement actions were issued against Medicare Advantage contracts, affecting 493 of 1173 unique contracts, or 42.0% of all contracts studied.
Most enforcement actions were civil money penalties arising from program audits, while enrollment suspensions and contract terminations were uncommon.
Penalty intensity was small relative to plan size, peaking at $6.50 per enrollee in 2019 and remaining below $3 per enrollee in all other years.
Contracts subject to termination or suspension appeared to serve more vulnerable populations, including a lower share of White beneficiaries and a higher share of dually eligible beneficiaries, raising important equity questions about oversight design and market exits.
Background
Medicare Advantage (MA) has moved from a peripheral delivery model to a dominant source of Medicare coverage. More than half of Medicare beneficiaries are now enrolled in MA, and annual federal payments to participating plans exceed $494 billion. As this public-private financing model grows, oversight becomes more than an administrative matter; it is central to beneficiary protection, program integrity, and stewardship of federal funds.
MA plans are paid prospectively to cover Medicare benefits and often offer supplemental benefits, care management programs, and narrower networks than traditional Medicare. In return, plans must comply with federal requirements related to access, marketing, claims processing, appeals, benefits administration, and quality reporting. When plans fail to meet these standards, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) can impose civil money penalties, suspend enrollment, or terminate contracts.
Yet policy discussion has often focused more on payment benchmarks, risk adjustment, prior authorization, and quality bonuses than on the actual scale and consistency of federal enforcement. That gap matters. If sanctions are too small, delayed, or inconsistently applied, they may not meaningfully deter nonadherence. Conversely, if severe actions such as termination disproportionately affect plans serving socially vulnerable populations, enforcement could have unintended access consequences. The study by Chen and colleagues addresses this underexamined aspect of MA regulation.
Study Design and Methods
Chen Z, Trivedi AN, Rooke-Ley H, Marr J, and Meyers DJ conducted a cross-sectional study of CMS enforcement actions against MA contracts from 2010 through 2023. The analysis included health maintenance organizations and preferred provider organizations participating in MA. Data analysis was performed from May 2025 to January 2026.
The investigators evaluated three main categories of enforcement action: civil money penalties, suspension of enrollment, and contract termination. Outcomes included the annual number of enforcement actions, the number of contracts affected, and mean monetary penalties per MA enrollee. The study also compared characteristics of contracts with and without enforcement actions, including star ratings and beneficiary composition.
Because this was a descriptive, cross-sectional analysis, it was designed to characterize patterns rather than establish causal relationships between enforcement and plan behavior. Still, for a regulatory topic where trend data are sparse, this approach is highly informative.
Key Results
Scope of enforcement activity
Across the 14-year study period, there were 1173 unique MA contracts and 844 enforcement actions. Nearly half of all unique contracts, 493 contracts or 42.0%, received at least one enforcement action. This finding alone is notable: compliance issues prompting formal CMS action were not rare events confined to a handful of outlier plans.
Program audits drove most sanctions
The majority of enforcement activity originated from program audits, which accounted for 544 actions, or 64.5% of all enforcement events. This suggests that direct oversight mechanisms remain the principal route by which noncompliance is identified. It also implies that observed enforcement may depend heavily on the intensity, frequency, and targeting of CMS audit operations. If audit practices vary over time, enforcement totals may partly reflect changes in surveillance rather than underlying compliance alone.
Marked year-to-year variability
One of the most striking findings was the instability of enforcement activity across years. In 2012, 100 contracts, representing 19.2% of active contracts, received monetary penalties. By contrast, only 5 contracts, or 0.9%, received such penalties in 2019. Such wide swings are difficult to reconcile with a stable regulatory environment and raise questions about whether enforcement has been episodic, resource-sensitive, or strategically redirected over time.
From a policy perspective, inconsistent enforcement may undermine deterrence. Plans are more likely to invest in compliance systems when oversight is predictable and sanctions are sufficiently probable. Large annual fluctuations can create the opposite signal: that enforcement depends on timing rather than a durable regulatory standard.
Monetary penalties were common, but generally modest
Civil money penalties dominated the enforcement portfolio, accounting for 737 actions, or 87.3% of all actions. Enrollment suspensions were much less frequent at 99 actions, or 11.7%, and contract terminations were rare, with only 8 actions, or 0.9%.
Although total penalties can appear substantial in absolute dollars, the study’s per-enrollee analysis provides a more policy-relevant benchmark. Financial penalties peaked at $6.50 per enrollee in 2019 and were below $3 per enrollee in every other year. For organizations receiving capitated payments for large enrolled populations, sanctions at this scale may be too small to materially alter organizational behavior, especially when weighed against the potential revenue associated with aggressive contracting, utilization management, or marketing practices.
This is the central tension highlighted by the study: MA now commands immense federal spending, yet the typical financial consequences of enforcement appear limited when normalized to enrollment.
Contracts with severe sanctions had poorer quality signals and different beneficiary mixes
Compared with contracts that did not receive enforcement actions, contracts that were terminated had lower star ratings, with a mean (SD) of 2.5 (0.5) stars versus 3.6 (0.6) stars. This aligns with the broader expectation that organizations with weaker operational performance may also struggle with regulatory compliance.
The beneficiary composition findings are equally important. Terminated contracts enrolled a substantially lower share of White beneficiaries, 44.7% compared with 68.7% among contracts without enforcement actions. Suspended contracts enrolled a higher share of dually eligible beneficiaries, 28.9% versus 18.8%.
These differences do not imply inappropriate enforcement. However, they do suggest that more severe regulatory actions may be concentrated among plans serving populations with greater social and medical complexity. This raises at least two possible interpretations. First, plans serving vulnerable beneficiaries may operate under greater financial and administrative strain, potentially increasing compliance risk. Second, when severe actions occur, the downstream impact on patient access and continuity of care may be disproportionately borne by populations already facing structural disadvantage.
Clinical and Policy Interpretation
For clinicians, these findings matter because regulatory compliance is not abstract. It affects network adequacy, prior authorization workflows, pharmacy access, grievance handling, and continuity of enrollment. Weak oversight can therefore translate into practical barriers at the bedside and in outpatient practice.
The study suggests that current enforcement may not be calibrated to the size and strategic importance of the MA market. When penalties remain in the low single digits per enrollee, they may function more as administrative signals than as true deterrents. In other regulated sectors, sanctions are often judged by whether they alter the expected cost-benefit calculation of noncompliance. The data reported here raise doubt that current MA sanctions consistently reach that threshold.
There is also a timing issue. Program audits and enforcement actions may occur well after beneficiaries have already experienced harms such as delayed care, confusion about benefits, or inappropriate denials. An effective oversight system should ideally combine retrospective sanctions with prospective surveillance tools, rapid complaint response, and transparent public reporting.
The equity dimension deserves particular attention. MA enrollment is high among beneficiaries with low incomes and among racial and ethnic minority populations in many markets. If the contracts most likely to face suspension or termination are also those serving more dually eligible or non-White populations, policymakers must ensure that enforcement does not inadvertently destabilize coverage without adequate transition protections. Stronger sanctions may still be necessary, but they should be paired with safeguards for enrollees, including active reassignment support, continuity-of-care requirements, and network transition monitoring.
Strengths and Limitations
The study’s strengths include its long observation window, contract-level national scope, and practical focus on enforcement intensity rather than simply counting actions. Expressing penalties per enrollee is particularly useful because it allows readers to judge sanctions relative to plan scale.
Several limitations should temper interpretation. First, the analysis is descriptive and cannot determine whether modest fines fail to deter misconduct, even though that concern is plausible. Second, enforcement actions capture only detected and formally sanctioned violations; they do not represent the full universe of compliance problems. Third, the annual variability observed may reflect changes in CMS audit strategy, staffing, or documentation practices, not just changes in plan conduct. Fourth, contract-level analysis may obscure heterogeneity within parent organizations that operate multiple contracts across regions.
Finally, the study does not directly link enforcement actions to patient-centered outcomes such as delayed care, hospitalization, appeal success, or beneficiary disenrollment. Future work should connect regulatory events to these downstream consequences.
How This Fits With the Broader Evidence Base
Recent policy literature has raised concerns about MA oversight in several domains, including prior authorization, risk adjustment, and coding intensity. Federal agencies and advisory bodies have repeatedly noted that as MA enrollment grows, oversight tools must evolve accordingly. The present study complements that broader literature by showing that formal enforcement has been common but financially modest and operationally uneven.
These findings are also consistent with concerns that quality signals and regulatory compliance do not always move together in a simple way. Star ratings provide one lens on plan performance, but they are not designed to fully capture contract administration, beneficiary protections, or legal compliance. The lower star ratings observed among terminated contracts suggest some overlap, but not enough to rely on quality scores alone as a regulatory proxy.
Implications for Practice and Policy
Several practical implications follow from this analysis. First, CMS may need to reassess the size and structure of civil money penalties so that sanctions are proportionate to enrollee volume and federal payment flows. Second, more consistent audit and enforcement cadence could strengthen deterrence by reducing uncertainty. Third, public reporting of enforcement actions should be accessible and understandable to beneficiaries, clinicians, and health systems.
Fourth, beneficiary protections should be central when severe actions are taken. Enrollment suspension and contract termination may be warranted, but they should trigger robust transition planning, especially for medically complex and dually eligible populations. Fifth, researchers should study whether contracts that receive sanctions subsequently improve on appeals processing, prior authorization timeliness, network adequacy, or patient experience.
For clinicians and health system leaders, awareness of plan enforcement history may become an increasingly relevant element of contracting strategy and patient counseling, particularly in markets dominated by MA.
Conclusion
This study provides a valuable national portrait of federal enforcement against Medicare Advantage plans over more than a decade. The main message is not that enforcement is absent, but that it has been highly variable and usually modest in financial magnitude. Given the scale of MA enrollment and spending, these findings raise legitimate concerns about whether current sanctions are sufficient to deter nonadherence and protect beneficiaries.
At the same time, the concentration of more severe actions among contracts serving more vulnerable populations highlights the need for carefully designed oversight that is both firm and equitable. As Medicare Advantage continues to expand, the effectiveness of enforcement will become an increasingly important determinant of quality, access, and public trust.
Funding and Trial Registration
The abstract provided does not report funding information. No ClinicalTrials.gov registration applies to this cross-sectional study of regulatory enforcement data.
References
1. Chen Z, Trivedi AN, Rooke-Ley H, Marr J, Meyers DJ. Federal Enforcement Actions Against Medicare Advantage Plans. JAMA Internal Medicine. Published May 4, 2026. PMID: 42081205.
2. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy. Washington, DC: MedPAC; annual reports, recent editions.
3. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Medicare Advantage and Part D Star Ratings technical notes and program audit guidance. CMS official documents.
4. Office of Inspector General, US Department of Health and Human Services. Reports on Medicare Advantage prior authorization and payment oversight. Published reports available through the HHS OIG website.
